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Page 1 of 2 Good Governance and Civil Society Participation in Africa OSSREA
INTRODUCTION
The post Cold War era ushered in challenges – both new and hitherto ignored- to the world arena, thereby altering the course of trends in the political and socio-economic spheres worldwide. With the advent of globalisation, emergence of a single superpower, growing disparity between rich and poor nations, widespread strife, along with bloody conflicts and general civil unrest, the last decades of the 20th century witnessed major shifts in the agendas of the West and introduction of new policies, reforms and initiatives.
Defining Good Governance
Over the past decade, the concepts of good governance and civil society participation have been assuming increasing priority in international discourse on politics and development across the world. There have been constant definitions and re-definitions – by institutions and individuals alike- as to what really constitutes good governance. Although by no means new, the term good governance featured prominently in the parlance of politico-economic discourse in the late 1980s. The World Bank, as the chief engineer of the good governance agenda defines it as the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development (1989, 60). The key components of good governance, according to the Bank, include effectiveness and efficiency in public sector management, accountability and responsiveness of public officials to the citizenry, rule of law and public access to information and transparency (World Bank 1992b, 3; 1994, viii). Indulging in a lengthy discourse on, or investigating detailed theoretical arguments surrounding the concept of good governance is beyond the immediate scope and purpose of this introduction. It would suffice to adopt a definition, which, more or less, incorporates the basic elements commonly shared by most existing definitions… Narrowly defined, governance means the exercise of political power to manage the affairs of state. In a broader sense, it can refer to the various processes relating to leadership, such as policy making, transparency, accountability, the protection of human rights and the relationship among the public, private and civil sectors in determining how power is exercised (Mutume 2005,11). In 1989, the World Bank released a report entitled, Sub-Saharan Africa: From crisis to sustainable growth. The report identified personalisation of power, prevalence of unaccountable and authoritarian governments, violation of human rights, rampant corruption, absence of the rule of law, state intervention in the economy, and lack of decentralisation as primary causes underlying the crisis in sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, the Bank stated in no uncertain terms that the road to emancipation of the continent was wholly hinged on getting rid of these ills and mal-practices (World Bank 1989, 7). When it became evident that Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) were not yielding the anticipated outcome in Africa, emphasis was shifted to political and economic reforms as the economic crisis facing the continent was attributed to the failure of national governance. In simpler terms, the Bank demanded for political pre conditions to support the strengthening of the economic conditionalities already imposed on developing countries by the Bretton Woods Institutions. Hence, according to the World Bank and donor agencies, one of the imperative ingredients of economic growth and development was now viewed as good governance. The reasoning behind this position was that, introducing liberal democratic institutions was not only essential for economic development, but that it will lead to the emergence of a democratic society and the development of good governance. In fact, good governance became a pre-requisite for securing loans from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), bi-lateral and multi-lateral institutions. In conjunction with this development and “acceptance” of the good governance agendas, various institutions, governmental, non-governmental organisations and development agencies have attempted to come up with yardsticks to measure the progress of democracy and good governance in various recipient countries. The inclusion of and emphasis on good governance as a conditionality for securing aid was not accepted unanimously, and was met with objections in some countries (Lumina 2004, 329-344). There was a general degree of uncertainty, unwillingness, implicit and explicit objections especially among governments of developing countries. Questions as to the practicality and fairness of the conditionalities were very often raised. As President Thabo Meki put it:
Notwithstanding some specific problems in some African countries, there are many among these countries that have and continue to have responded positively, even under very difficult circumstances, to the prescription of both the perspective investors as well as the multilateral institutions. Many of these countries have created the necessary climate conducive to investment, for example by liberalising their trade, privatising state-owned enterprises, reforming their tax system and generally adhering to the prescribed injunctions, all done in an attempt [to receive] the necessary investments. The response from the developed countries, to these attempts by especially many African countries to stay within the confines of the rules, has been to treat the African continent as one country, and therefore, to punish a country on one end of the continent for the deeds of another on the other end (Address by President Thabo Mbeki to the Commonwealth Club, World Affairs Council and United States-South Africa Business Council Conference, San Francisco, 24 May 2000).
Other objections emanated from those who contended that the mere presence of multi-party systems and regular elections, free press and other liberalisation reforms installed in the administrative institutions does not necessarily guarantee the transition to democracy. As Kenneth Good highlights, patterned democracy in the form of institutional structures – an option which almost every African state has embraced in principle – does not necessarily give rise to participatory politics, nor to good governance (Good 1997, 2; 1999).
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OSSREA Publications
